Fair Housing Council Of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.Com, LLC Separate Statement Of Uncontroverted Facts And Conclusions Of Law In Support Of Defendant\u27s Motion For Summary Judgement by unknown
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 1
l2
1 3
T4
1 5
T 6
17
1 8
1 9
20
2 l
22
23
24
25
OUINN EMANUEL URQUHART OLIVER & HEDGES, LLP
- Timothv L. Aleer (Bar No. 160303)
Steven B. Stislitz (BarNo.222667\
865 South Fiãueroà Street, 10th Flóor
Los Anseles. Cãlifornia 90017-2543
Telepho:n e:'(213) 443-3000
Facsimile: (213) 443-3100
Attorneys for Defendant Roommate.com, LLC
FAIR HOUSING COUNCIL OF
SAN FERNANDO VALLEY; FAIR
HOUSING COUNCIL OF
SAN DIEGO. individually and on behal
of the GENERAL PUBLIC,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROOMMATE.COM, LLC,
Defendant.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CASE NO. CV03-9386 PA (RZx)
SEPÄRATE STATEMENT OF
T]NC ONTROVERTED F'AC TS
AND CONCLUSIONS LAW IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION F'OR SUMMARY
Jt]DGMENT
Date: September 13,2004
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Place: Courtroom 15
Honorable Percy Anderson
26
27
28
04363/60r089.1
ld'Ttut"t 
filed: Decenfter 22,
Pre-trial Conf.: October 15,2004
Trial Date: November 9,2004
SEPARATE STATEMENT OF I.JNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1
2
a
J
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 0
1 1
T2
1 3
1 4
1 5
t 6
Uncontroverted Facts
Conclusions of Law
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1. Defendant Roommate.com, LLC
("Roommate") owns and operates
Roommates.com, a roommate locator
service that is accessed through the
Internet at htþ : / I www.roommates. com.
Uncontroverted Facts
1 0
1 1
t 2
1 3
t4
1 5
l 6
2. Roommates.com is the largest of
one of a nurnber of similar services: the
basic proposition is that individuals
who have residences that they wish to
share, and individuals who are looking
for residences to share, may post
Declaration of Bryan peters in Suppon
of Defendant's Motion for Summarv
Judgment, dated Aug. tg, 2004
("Peters Decl."), fl 2.
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information about themselves and the
housing on a searchable database.
3. Users can search the database
based on certain criteria, including
geographic location and roommate
characteristics.
23
24
25
26
27
+363160t089.r
Peters Decl. llfl 3-6, Exs. A, B.
4. Roommates.com receives over
50,000 visits and 1,000,000 page views
per day.
Peters Decl. T118, 9.
SEPARATE STATEN4E
Peters Decl. fl 4.
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5. It has approximately 150,000
active listings; approximately 40,000
users are offering rooms for rent at
their personal residence, andabout
110,000 users are looking for a
residence to share.
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6. Basic membership is free of
charge and allows a user to create a
personal profile, conduct searches of
the database, and send "roommail" to
other users. Basic members are unable
to view profile "comments" (free-form
essays), full-size photos, or "roommail"
sent by other members.
Peters Decl.,il 10.
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upgrade his or her membership, and
this gives the user full access to all
features of the website, including the
ability to read profile "comments" and
the "roommail" to the upgraded
member sent by other users.
8. Approximately 24,000 users are
upgraded, paytng members. Members
exchange approximately 3 0,000
"roommails" per day, andthere are
Peters Decl. fl 10
For payment of a fee, a user may peters Decl. ï 10.
SEPARATE STATEMENT oF TÑ
Peters Decl. 1T 10.
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currently more than 1.3 million
"roommail" messages on Roommate's
servers.
9. When a person reaches
Roommates.com through the Internet,
he or she is accessing Roommate's
computer servers located in Mesa
Artzona.
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10. These servers store the data that
comprises member profiles (discussed
below), as well as the "roommail"
messages ent among the members.
The servers also contain the1 5
r6
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Peters Decl. fl 7.
programming that presents users with a
questionnaire to create a profile,
presents the member profiles on the
computer screen in a standardized
format, and enables users to do
searches.
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Peters Decl. !f 7.
1 1. Through the Intern et, many
thousands of users are able to access
and use a searchable database on
Roommate's computer servers.
SEPARATE STATEMENT OÈ
Peters Decl. fl 8.
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12. To become a member of
Roommates.com, a person must author
a personal profile.
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13. When listing a room for rent, the
user responds to prompts that result in
the posting of specific information
about the area, rent and deposit
information, date of availability, and
features of the residence.
Peters Decl. ïï l1-31, Exs. H-AA
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14. Information may be posted about
the occupants of the household, as well
as roommate preferences. For
example, individuals may state whether
they are willing to live with a smoker,
with pets, and preferred cleanliness
level, occupation, location, etc.
Peters Decl. nZ3, Exs. R-U.
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15. Users who are posting
residences to share must disclose their
sex and sexual orientation, and they
may speciff a roommate preference on
that basis.
Peters Decl. ffi 24-26, Exs. V-y.
16. Users must state whether they
are willing to live with children.
1363/60t089.1
Peters Decl. ln 24, 26, Exs. V, y.
SEPARATE STATEMENT OF
Peters Decl. 1[ 26, Ex. y.
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17. These preferences are optional;
the default setting for each
charactenstic is no preference, and the
user must alter this setting to indic ate a
preference.
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18. The questionnaire makes no
mention of racial or religious
preferences.
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19. Users may include additional
information about themselves or their
residence in the "Additional
Comments" section of the
Peters Decl. 1126, Ex. y.
questionnaire, which may be viewed as
part of the user's profile bypayng
members. The "Additíonal Comments"
portion of a user's profile is a "blank
slate" where the user can speak freely,
just like an Internet bulletin board or
chat room. The "Additional2 l
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Peters Decl. 1126, Ex. y.
Peters Decl. 1l1T 10, Zl,27,Exs. e, Z.
Comments" are incorporated into a
user's profile without any editing or
alteration by Roommate.
20. Users also may post up to six
images to be displayed with their
profile.
SEPARATE STATE
Peters Decl. tlfl 20, 25, Exs. p, X.
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21. Roommate does not review or
edit the text of users'profiles.
22. As soon as a new user completes
the questionnaire, the resulting profile
is made available online to other users.
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23. Members are permitted to
change their profiles at any time. These
revisions are not reviewed bv
Roommate.1 1
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Peters Decl. TT 9, 30.
24. Roommate reviews photographs
before they are posted, to make sure
they do not contain images that violate
the terms of service, such as obscene
images or contact information (such as
telephone numbers and e-mail
Peters Decl. 1[9, 30.
Peters Decl. 1T31.
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addresses) that is normally accessible
only to paylng members through
t'roommail" and profile "comments. "
25. Under its Terms of Service
("Terms"), Roommate informs users
that it does not screen the postings.
Roommate also informs users that
Roommate is not the author of the
information posted on the service, and
Peters Decl. n 42.
4363/60t089.1
SEPá,RATE STATEMENT OJ' I.INCO}TTR OVER
Peters Decl. flI[32-41, Ex. DD.
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that: "[A]11 publicly posted or
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privately transmitted information, data,
text, photographs, graphics, messages
or other materials,("Content") are the
sole responsibility of the person from
which such Content originated." The
user is "entirely responsible for all
Content" he or she uploads,
downloads, posts, emails, transmits or
otherwise uses. The Terms further
explain that Roommate cannot and will
not guarantee the accuracy, integrity or
quality of such content. Each user
agrees that Roommate will not be
liable for any content made available
via the service.
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26. While Roommate (which has 10
employees) is able to efficiently review
images before they are posted, the
monitoring of text would be a crushing
burden.
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27. Comments posted by members
may be up to 65,000 characters, and
many members'profiles are quite
lengthy.
4363/601089.1
Peters Decl. 1T1l I (10 employees),43
(efficiency of review).
SEPAB4TTE STATEMENT Or f ruCOtrlrnovtrRTEn na¡rc
Peters Decl. 1[ 43.
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28. Further, such review would
necessarily involve subjective
judgments and would place Roommate
in the role of editor, censor and arbiter
of taste and morals.
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29. Roommate relies on its members
to report abuses in the profiles. It then
investigates the complaint and removes
the offending profile if appropriate.
Such complaints are rare.
Peters Decl. ll43.
30. Similarly, if a member is found
to be sending offensive "roommail" to
other members, Roommate will
eliminate his or her access to the
service.T 7
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Peters Decl. n 44.
31. Roommate does not monitor
"roommail" among mernbers, so, like
other types of abuse, this type of abuse
is discovered only when the members
report it.
Peters Decl. l[ 44.
32. Some Roommate.com users have
religious beließ that impact their
selection of roommates. Many are
Christians, and plaintifß in this case
,4363t601089.1
Peters Decl. n 44.
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have complained about some of these
postings. But Roommate.com's users
come from all walks of life and have a
broad spectrum of beliefs. By
referencing these beliefs in their
profiles, users avoid the need to
contact and interview dozens of
incompatible people.
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1. summaryiudgment is appropriate where the defendant
establishes that there can be no liabilify because of an immunity or privile ge. See,
e.g., u.s. v. ciqv of Spokane, grg F.zdg4,g6 (9th cir. 1990) (affrrming grant of
summary judgment based in part on immunity).
2. Summary judgment is also appropriate where there is no
dispute as to material fact andthe application of a statute would be
Conclusions of Law
unconstitutional, see Morrison v. Hall,26I F.3d 896, g05 (9th Cir. Z00l),or the
statute itself is unconstitutional, see Edwards v. Aguillard ,482U.S. 57g, 5g4-g5
2 l
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(1987) (affirming sunmary judgment based on violation of Establishment Clause
by state creationism law). See also Desert Outdoor Advertisins Tnc w cirr¡ nr
Moreno valley, 103 F.3d 814, 816 (9th Cir. I 996) (ordering trial court to grant
summary judgment where sign ordinance violated First Amendment).
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3' Congress has immunized all interactive computer services from
.publisher liability arising from content supplied by third parties. congress
recognized that the expansion of the Internet would be stymied if interactive
computer services were confronted with the dilemma of either (1) reviewing and
editing all third-parfy content, or (2) actingas a pure conduit, exercising no
editorial control whatsoever. Because plaintiffs' theory of liability rests
completely on defendant's publication user-supplied content, plaintiffs,claims are
barred by the CDA.
I. PLAINTIFF'S' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE
COMMT]NICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF' 1996
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4- Interactive computer services are not subject to liability for
content provided by third parties. The CDA states: "No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provide r.,, 47 U.S.C.
$ 230(c)(1). An "interactive computer service" is "any information seryice [or]
system . . . that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer seryer." Id. ç 230(Ðe).
2 l
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1995), in which Prodigy was found liable as a "publisher" of false information
posted by the user of a financial bulletin board. Under common law, one who
repeats a libel is subject to liability as if he had originally published it. Barr]¡ v.
Time. Inc. ,584 F. Supp. H r0, rlz2 (N.D. cal. I 9g\;Restatemenr (second) Torrs
5. congress enacted section 230 inresponse to the decision in
$ 578 (1977)- In confrast, conduits that do not exercise editorial control are
"distributors" and are not liable unless they knew or had reason to know that a
statementprovidedbyanotherwasfalse.@,83F.R.D.455,463-
64 (8.D. cal. 1979), affd, 7 r0 F.2d, s4g (gthcir. t 9g3); Resratemenr $ 5g l.
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6. Prodigy was liable because it chose to edit third-parfy content
"on the basis of offensiveness and'bad taste."' Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL
323710 at*4- The court said the outcome would have been different if prodigy
had made user content available without alteration (i.e., acted merely as a
distributor), and had not taken the publisher's role of "determining what is proper
for its members to post and read on its bulletin boards.,, Id.
7. By withdrawing interactive services from republication
tiability, Congress sought to ovemrle Stratton Oakrnont while encouraging open
discourse on the Internet.
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8- The purpose of section230 was to "protect finteractive
computer services] from taking on liability such as occurïed in the prodigy
case . . . " 141 cong. Rec. H8460-01, *H8470 (daily ed. August 4, 1995
(comments of Rep. cox); see also House conf. Rpt. No. 104-45g (l04th cong.,2d,
Sess.), at 194 þurpose of immunity provision was to ovemrle Stratton Oalanont
and protect all interactive computer services, including non-subscriber business
systems); senate Rpt. No. 104-230 (l04th cong., 2d sess.), ú 194 (same) (e
Declaration of Timotþ Alger in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Dated
August 19, 2004 ffi z- ,Exhs. A-C.)
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9. Congress recognized that the information revolution made
possible by the Internet would be hampered if computer services that made third-
party content available to others were held to the same liability standards as the
original speakers. See 47 U.S.C. $ 230(bXD, Q) ("It is the policy of rhe United
States . . . to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer seryices and other interactive media [and] to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation',). See
Batzel v. Smith,333 F.3d 1018, 1026-29 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Cr.
2812 Q004) (discussing the origin and goals of section 230).
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10- The CDA's immunity is broad and absolute. Section 230
precludes liabilify wherever the complained-of content is posted by third parties
and publication is an element of the plaintiffs claim. The provision ,,overrides the
traditional treatment of publishers, distributors, and speakers under statutory and
common law." Batzel,333 F.3d at 1026; accord Carafano v. Metrosplash.corn,
rnc.,339 F.3d I 1 19, llzz-25 (9th cir. 2003). "fJnder g 230(c), . . . so long as a
third party willingly provides the essential published content, the interactive
computer service receives full immunity regardless of the specific editing or
select ionprocess. ' 'Carafano,33gF.3dat | |24;seealso@,
992 F . Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 199S) ("In view of this statutory language, plaintiff s
argument hat the Washington Post would be liable if it had done what AOL did
1 0
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here . . . has been rendered irrelevant by Congress.").
11. The courts have consistently interpreted the CDA with
Congress'express goals in mind, while rccognizing the impossible burden that
would be imposed if interactive services were required to screen and control users,
postings. In Zeran v. America Online. Inc. l2g F.3d,327 ( thCir. 1997), cert.
denied, 524U.5.937 (1995), false postings on an America online (',AOL")
bulletin board caused the plaintiff to be deluged with abusive phone calls,
including death threats. Id. at329. TheFourth Circuit rejected the contention that
AOL had tort tiability for allowing the postings and then not removing them
quickly enough:
Congress made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful online speech
through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve
as intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages. Congress,
purpose in providing the $ 230 immunity was thus evident. Interactive
computer services have millions of users. The amount of information
communicated via interactive computer seryices is therefore staggering.
The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an
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obvious chilling effect. It would be impossible for service providers to
screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems. Faced with
potential liability for each message republished by their services, interactive
computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and
fype of messages posted. congress considered the weight of the speech
interests implicated and chose to immunize service providers to avoid anv
such restrictive effect.
Id. at 330-31 (quoted by Ninth Circuit with approval in Carafano , 33g F.3d at
1123-24); accordBatzel,333 F.3d at 1027-28 ("Making interactive computer
services and their users liable for the speech of third parties would severely restrict
the information available on the Internet. Section 230 therefore sought to preventl 1
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lawsuits from shutting down websites and other services on the Internet.,,).
12. zeran's broad view of the immunity provision has been
consistently applied in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Caraiano,33g F.3d at 1l2l
(false dating profile on "Matchmaker" website); Ben Ezra. Weinstein and Co..
Inc. v. America online. Inc. ,206 F.3d 980, 983 (10th cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
u.s. 824 (2000) (stock information made available on AoL's "euotes &
Portfolios" service); Blumenthal , ggZF. Supp. at 46(allegation of wife-beating in
on-line magazine); Patentwizard. Inc. v. Kinko's. Inc. ,163 F. supp. 2d 1069,
I07l-72 (D.S.D. 2001) (statements about patent service made in chat room by user
of defendant's computers); Morrison v. America Online. Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2dg30,2 l
22
23
24
25
26
27
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933-34 CN.D. Ind. 2001) (threats directed at physician, disrribured by e-mail);
2004) (compiled complaints forwarded to Internet providers); Gentry v. eBa% Inc.,
99 CaL App. 4th 816,832, l2I Cal. Rptr. 2d703 Q002) (offers to sell counterfeir
sports memorabilia on Internet auction site); 
,
783 So'2d 1010, l0l7 (Fla. 2001) (use of chat roorns to market obscene photos);
4363/601089.r
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schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc. 3 I p.3d 3 7 , 4r-42 (wash. ct. App. 2001)
(allegation in reader book review that author was a felon).
13. Plaintifß'claims fall within the scope of; and are barred by, the
CDA. The immunity of section 230(c)(1) applies to every type of information
service "that provides or ena'bles computer access by multiple users to a computer
server ' ' '" 47 U.S.C. $ 230t(f)(2). This broad sweep includes interactive websites
such as Roommates.com. Through the Internet, many thousands of users are able
to access and use a searchable database on Roornmate's computer seryers. ^See
,207 F. Supp. 2d,1055,1065_66 (C.D. Cal.
2002), affd,339 F.3d I 1 I 9 (9th cir. 2003); Genrry. 99 cat. App. 4th at B3t n.7;
schneider, 31 P.3d at40; see alsoBenBna,z06F.3d at 9g3,9g5 ($ 230(c)
applied to searchable database of third-party stock quotes); Batzel,333 F.3d at
1030 & n.15 (rejecting argument that $ 230(c) applied onlyto Internet service
providers)).
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14. Further, plaintiffs' claims treat Roommate as a publisher;
indeed, it is the only theory under which plaintifß attempt to hold Roommate
liable. (FAC In rc42,43,52.) Section 230(c) "precludes courts from
entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher,s
role." Zeran,I2gF.3d'at330. The publisher's role includes the decisions ,,to
publish, withdraw, posþone or alter content." Id. Claims of all kinds that seek to
impose liability for failure to remove a posting are barred. Schneider, 3l p.3d at
464 (CDA extends to all civil claims involving publisher liability for third-party
content); Carafano,339 F.3d at 1123, ll25 (disrnissing defamation, invasion of
pnvacy, and negligence claims).
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15. Finally, plaintiffs are seeking to recover from Roommate for
the publication of third-party content. Plaintiffs complain about the preferences
expressed by users; no claim is made as to any expression ofpreference by
Roommate. See Gentrlr, 99 Cal.App. 4that834 (representations on auction
4363t60r089.r
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\¡/ebsite were made by users; categonzation and compilation of postings did not
abrogate immunity)
16. Roommate is not an "information content providsr', in respect
to the statements that are the subject of this lawsuit. Plaintifß seek to impose
liability on the notion that Roommate creates content with its questionnaire (FAC
11 11-13), but the Ninth Circuit has already rejected this theory. The collection,
formatting, and manipulation of information does not transform statements made
by a third party into content created by the service. Carafano ,33g F.3d at
l t24-2s.
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[T]he fact that Matchmaker classifies user characteristics into discrete
categories and collects responses to specific essay questions does not
transform Matchmaker into a "developer" of the "underlyrng
misinformation." . . . Matchmaker's decision to structure the information
provided by users allows the company to offer additional features, such as
"matching" profiles with similar characteristics or highly strucfured searches
based on cornbinations of multiple choice questions. Without standardized,
easily encoded answers, Matchmaker might not be able to offer these
services and certainly not to the same degree.
17. The Ninth Circuit also made clear in Carafano that the fact that
rd.
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an rnteracttve computer service provides some content on its site does not abrogate
the immrurity.
. . . [T]he statute precludes treatment as a publisher or speaker for,,any
information provided by another information content provider .u 47 U.S.C.
$ 230(c)(1) (emphasis added). The statute would still bar [plainriffs] claims
unless Matchmaker created or developed the particular information at issue.
+363/601089.1
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. . . "The critical issue is whether [the interactive computer service] acted as
an information content provider with respect to the information that
appellants claim is false or misleading."
Id. at ll25 (quoting Gentry, 99 cal. App. 4th at 833 n. Il); accord Novak v.
overture servs.. Inc., 309 F. supp. 2d446,452-53 (E.D.N.Y .2004).
18. Here, plaintiffs allege that the preferential statements of users
of Roommates.com are unlawful. It is the users who create the profiles and select
the information in the profiles. Plaintiffs identiSr no statement of Roommate t'nat
indicates a preference. The site's questionnaire is simply a method of collecting
standardized information for a convenient, searchable database. Roommate is not
the "content provider" of the complained-of statements, and is therefore immune
from any liability for those statements.
19. Plaintiffs claims under the FHA and state law are not exempt
from the CDA. Section 230(e) provides that "No cause of action may be brought
and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent
with this section;' 47 U.S.C. $ 230(eX3). Exempted are federal criminal statutes,
intellectual property law, state laws that are consistenr with section 230, andthe
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. 47 U.S.C. g 230(e)(l)-(4).
20. In Noah v. AoL Time warner Inc. , 26l F. supp. zd s32 (8.D.
T 7
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Ya. 2003), affd'2004wL 60271 I (4rh Cir. 2003), the plainriff alleged rhat
offensive comments about Muslims in an AOL chat room violated Title II of the
civil Rights Act of 1964, 42U.5.C. $$ 2000 a et seq. He contended that the cDA
did not bar his claim because AOL was being treated as the owner of a place of
public accommodation, ot a "publisher.u Id. at 538-39.
2l- The Noah court rejected this argument as "flatly contradicted
by $ 230's exclusion of some specific federal claims.,,
[T]he exclusion of federal criminal claims, but not federal civil rights
claims, clearly indicates, under the canon of expressio unis est exclusio
t4363/601089.1
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alterius, that Congress did not intend to place federal civil rights claims
outside the scope of $ 230 immunity. In short, congress' decision to
exclude certain claims but not federal civil rights claims as a group, or Title
I Ispeci f ica| |y ,mustberespected.See@,534U.S.19,
28,722 s. ct. 44l, r5l L. Ed. 2d339 (2001) (noting that',where congress
explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional
exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of a contrary legislative
intent").
Id.; see ø/so u.s. v. Johnson,52g u.s. 53, 58 (2000) ("IVhen congress provides
exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts have authorify to create
others.").1 1
t2
I3
l 4
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22' Moreover, punishing Roommate for the postings of its users
runs conhary both to Congress' expressed intention in CDA of fostering a vibrant
markeþlace of information on the Internet and theFirst Amendment,s protection
of free speech. Plaintifß seek to turn Roommate into a censor. ,See Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (striking down the CDA's indecencyprovisions;
"As a matter of constitutional tradition, . . . we presume that govemmental
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free
,exchange of ideas than to encourage it.").
23. Roommate is immune from liability under the cDA, and
summary judgment must be granted to defendant as to all of plaintiffs, clairns.
II. PLATNTIF'F'S' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
24. Plaintifß' claims are barred by the First Amendment to the
united States constitution because they seek to impose liability *nder statutes that
regulate speech on the basis of content and viewpoint.
2 l
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25. Moreovet, even if the postings on Roommates.com are
considered commercial speech, plaintiffs'claims do not meet the requirements of
5
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and they are invalid for that reason as well.
26. Plaintiffs' interpretation of FHA and FEHA is unconstitutional.
The FHA makes it unlawful to publish "any notice, statement, or advertisement,
with respect o the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation,
or discrimination." 42 u.s.c. g 360a(c) (emphasis added). The FEHA has a
nearly identical provision, with the additional categories of "sexual orientation,"
"marital status," ancestr¡/, and "disability." Cal. Govt. code $ 12955(c).
27. During the 36 years since the FHA was enacted, the United
States Supreme Court has developed exacting standards by which any regulation
of speech must be judged. The Supreme Court's decisions leave no doubt that it
would reject the application of the FHA and the FEHA urged by plaintifß. The
FHA must comply with these standards because it was enacted "to provide, wíthin
1 8
r9
20
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447 U.S. ss7 (1980),
constitutional imitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."
42 U.S.C. $ 1301 (emphasis added).
28- "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content." Police Dept. of the cilv of chicago v. Mosley,40g u.s.
92,95 (1972) (striking down ordinance prohibiting demonstrations near schools
except peaceful abor picketing). "The First Amendment generally prevents
govemment from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of
disapproval of the ideas expressed." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 IJ.S.377,3g2
(1992) (citations omitted); see also Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech
)4363t601089.1
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Q004) $ 3:3 ("'When the government's purpose is disagreement with the message,
the regulation is obviously content-based. ").
29- The Supreme Court applies "strict scrutiny" to content-based
speech regulations, and this analysis inevitably leads to a finding of
unconstitutionality. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Mernbers of the New york
7
8
9
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State Crime Victims Board , 502 U.S. 105, 120-21(1991); Consolidared Edison
co. v. Public service comm.,447 u.s. 530,536 (19g0). The government does
not have a compelling interest in controlling speech relating to the search for and
selection of roommates. Individuals have the right to freely select those with
whom they choose to live. The interpretation urged by plaintifß merely interferes
with the exercise of that right.
30. Also, sections 360a(c) and 12955(c) are not narrowly tailored
to achieve the government's interest. As interpreted by plaintifß, the provisions
prohibit a broad sweep ofprotected speech, including the pnvate,one-on-one
communications of those considering rooming together. The evangelical Christian
who seeks a roommate who will join in daily Bible study, and the orthodox Jew
who keeps a kosher kitchen, are forbidden from speaking to others about matters
that are of great concern to them as they decide whether to form an intimate
association.
31. Moreover, even if the government had an interest in restricting
public speech that some might consider offensive or perpetuating of stereotypes,
this would be an insufficient interest under the First Amendment. See Simon &
Schuster, Inc.,502 U.S. at 118 ("'[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive
is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it."' (quoting Hustler Magazine. Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (19S8))
32- The Constitution's rejection of content-based regulations
extends even to categories of speech that can be forbidden altogether. In R.A.V.,
the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that outlawed expressive conduct
20
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"which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender. . . .,,
505 U.S. at 380 (emphasis added). The ordinance was restricted to proscribable
"fighting 1vords," yet the Court held that the government could not regulate such
speech based "on hostility -- or favoritism -- towards the underlying message
expressed." Id. at 386.
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33. "Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious
or severe, are permissible [under the ordinance] unless they are addressed to one
of the specified disfavored topics. Those who wish to use "fighting words" in
connection with other ideas -- to express hostility, for example, on the basis of
political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality -- are not covered. The
First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those
speak
34. The Supreme Court also found that the ordinance engaged in
viewpoint discrimination, in that it permitted those who favor racial tolerance to
use "fighting words" while punishing opponents who use the same speech. While
1 8
t 9
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the city's desire to restrict "messages of 'bias-motivated'hatred" was laudable,
"[t]he point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed
in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content." Id. at 392.
35- Section 360a@) and section 12955(c) undoubtedly evince a
"special hostility towards the particular biases . . . singled out." Id. at395.
Neither forbids a statement indicating a preference to rent or sell to Democrats,
senior citizens, pet owners, college students, cigarette smokers, or those who are
gainfully employed. If plaintiffs'view that the statutes reach shared living
alrangements is correct, the statutes violate the First Amendment by adopting the
position that it is wrong to choose who you live with based on certain
characteristics, and silence the speech of those who consider any of the disfavored
characteristics to be important. Indeed, those people who seek to share their
4363t60t089.r
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homes with members of groups that often have difficulty finding housing (such as
racial minorities, the disabled, and homosexuals) cannot (in plaintifß view) state
these facts without running afoul of section 360a@) and sectio n 12955(c).
36- Even if it is assumed that the governmental interest here is
diversity in housing,thatinterest may be advanced by alternatives that do not run
afoul of the First Amendment. The FHA and the FEHA already prohibit
discrimination in the actual rental or sale of a dwelling; the goal of ending actual
discrimination is better served by prosecuting those who unlawfully discriminate
in such transactions, rather than publishers. see 42u.s.c. g 360a(a), (b), (d), (Ð.
Educating and sensitizing the public regarding offensive speech and stereogpes
can be better advanced by educational advertisements than by interfering with the
efforts of individuals seeking compatible living parûrers and imposing a burden on
an interactive computer service.
37. Here, the FHA and the FEHA silence certain disfavored
categories of speech, while leaving all other preferential speech about housing
unrestricted. This violates the Constitution, even where the government has good
1 0
1 1
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intentions. See 
,3ZI F.3d l\l7.
1223-25 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting policy that allows display of flags along stare
highways and forbidding all other signs and bann ers); seealso Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Dale, 530 u.s. 640, 661 (2000) (approving Boy scouts' exclusion of
homosexuals under right of expressive association; the law "is not free to interfere
with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the
govefnment"); collin v. smith , 578 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (7th cir. IgTg)(striking
down ordinance restricting march by Nationalist socialist parfy of America in
heavily Jewish community; "That the effective exercise of First Amendment rights
may undercut a given government's policy on some issue is, indeed, one of the
20
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purposes of those rights. No distinction is constitutionally admissible that turns
on the intrinsic justíce of the particurar poricy in issue.,, (emphasis added)).
38' "The First Amendment does not guarantee that other concepts
virfually sacred to our Nation as a whole -- such as the principle that
6
7
8
9
1 0
discrimination on the basis ofrace is odious and destructive -- wil go
unquestionedinthemarketp1aceofideas.' '@,497IJ.S.3g7,414,
418 (1e8e).
39. The commercial speech doctrine does not appry here. The
postings on Roommates.com do not merely "propose a commercial transaction,,,
resultinginreducedprotectionundertheFirstAmendment@
Discovery Network. Inc. ,507 u.s. 4r0, 423 (1993); see arso@
Fed' of the Blind , 487 u.s. 78 1,795-96 (198S) (speech with commercial aspects is
still fully protected where interfwined with informative speech). Although users
indicate a desire to share the expenses of a residence, those costs are asmall
1 1
T2
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fraction of the information in a Roommates.com posting. users describe
t 7
1 8
1 9
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themselves, their interests, their characteristics (messy, clean), their schedules 
, rfld
the homes they hope to share. If econonúc motive was the sole reason for the
postings, users would not be interested in disclosing all this personal information
to others' users are looking for people with whom they can comfo rtably and,
safely share living quarters.
40' Indeed, the preferences expressed in the profiles run counter to
the users'economic interests, because they limitthe potential matches. This
23
24
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28
simply isnotacaseof ' ' Iwi11sel lyouXattheYpr ice. , ,@
D1*^*^^-- -- r  r :
, 425 U.S. 74g, 762 (tg76);
see also Bigelow v. Virginia,42! U.S. g09, glg (1975) (,,The xistence of
'commercial 
activity, in itself is no justification for narrowing the protection of
expressionsecuredbytheFirstAmendment.''');compcffe@
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advertisements were "no more than aproposal ofpossibre employment,,).
4I' The restrictions urged byplaintifß are unconstitutional even
under the commercial speech doctrine. In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court
formulated a four-part analysis for determining whether a regulation of
colnmercial speech passes constifutional muster. First, the court must determine
as a threshold matter whether the commercial speech is protected by the First
Amendment -- i.e., whether the cornmercial speech concerns lawful activity and is
not misleading. Second, the court must determine whether the government has a
substantial interest in regulating the expression. Third, the court must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest. Fourth, the
court must determine whether the regulation is no more extensive than necessary
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413 U.S. 376,385 (1973) (gender_based
1 3
T4
1 5
T 6
r7
1 8
t 9
20
to serve the governmental interest. 447 u.s. at s66.
42. The interpretation of the FHA and the FEHA fails even the
intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson. The postings do not involve illegal
activity' Selection of roommates is protected by the right of intimate association.
The united States Constitution recognizes aright of intimate association, which
permits people to freely choose those with whom they live and socialize. The
Supreme Court most recently acknowledged this substantive due process right in
Lawrence v. Texas,539 u.s. 55g, r23 s. ct. 2472 e003),when it struck down a
2 l
22
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Texas stafute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in
certain sexual conduct: "Libertyprotects the person from unwarranted
govemment intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the
state is not omnipresent in the home ." 1d.,123 s. ct. at 247s. The activities of
consenting adults within their homes, even outside of marriage, is beyond the
power of the govemment. Id. at24g3_g4.
1363/601089.r
43. In 
, 431 U .S. 4g4 (1977), the
Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that restricted which relatives
SEPARATE STATEMENT OF
24
t 
ff oualified as "family" under the housing code. The court made clear that
2 
ff 
substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit the
3 
ff sovemment to control iving situations; "[T]he Constitution prevents East
4 fl cleveland from standardizingitschildren and its adults by forcing them to live int f
5 
ff 
cetain narrowly defined family patterns." Id. at505-06. In his concu''.ence,
6 
fi 
Justice Brennan explained that the constitutional principle behind the Moore
z 
flhotaing went beyond the rights of relatives to households of many Ð/pes:
t 
fl 
The constitution cannot be interpreted 
. . . to rolerate the imposition by
9 ll government upon the rest of us of white suburbia's preference in pattems oft l
to 
lf 
family living. The "extended family" . . . remains not merely still a
11 ll pervasive living pattern, but under the goad of brutal economic necessit¡r, 
. .il
l2ll ' a means of suwival for large numbers of the poor and deprived minoritiesil
t' 
fl 
of our society. For them compelled pooling of scant resources requires
14ll compelled sharing of a household.
15ll rd. at 508.
tu 
fl 44. This right of intimate associarion i cludes the right to exclude.
tz 
fl although it rejected the Jaycees' claim that they were exempt from a state
18 ff nondiscrimination stafute, the supreme court in Roberts v. united states Jaycees,il
19 
ff 
468 U'S' 609 (1984), recognized that adults may select (or exclude) other adults
zo ll in highly personal relationships without government interference. ,,[F]reedom oft l
21 ff association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty .u rd.t l
zzllat 618-19' Such relationships involve the "distinctively personal aspects of one,s
23 
fl 
life' ' ' ' [T]hey are distinguished by such attributes as relarive smallness, a high
z+lldeuree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation , and,
25 ff seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationsh ip.,, Id. at 620.
'uil 45' It is beyond ispute that roommate relationships meet hese
zl 
llcnteria, 
and people are entitled to create a household without government
1363/60r089.1
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interference. These are relationships of two, three, or four people who choose to
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share kitchen, bathroom, and living areas not just for economic reasons, but also
because they have compatible lifestyles. In many situations (as shown by many of
the Roommate. com postings complained of by plaintifß), individuars seek
5
6
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roommates with the same religious beliefs. others seek roommates of the sarne
sex or sexual preference; they understandably want to share a home with others
with whom they are comfortable. The goveïïìment cannot compel a woman to live
with aman, a homosexual to live with a heterosexual, a nonsmoker to live with a
chain-smoker, or a cat lover to live with the owner of dogs. And, no more than it
can force or forbid procreation, the government carurot compel people to live \Mith
children not their own. The postings on Roommates.com clearly involve lawful
1 t
t2
1 3
t4
1 5
t 6
activity.
46' The california constitution also recognizes a right ofprivacy
that includes the right to share living quarters with any other person without
interference by the govemment. see california const., Art. I, $ 1; Çity of santa
Barbara v. Adamson 
,27 cal.3d, r23, 164 cal.Rptr. 539 (19g0) (reversing
preliminary injunction against residents who viol ated,zoning statute on the
T 7
t 8
t 9
20
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grounds that the statute limiting the number of unrelated persons in a single-family
house improperly abridged the right to privacy); accord@
Rptr. 2d 802 (2001).
47 ' Moreover, the FHA and FEIIA were never intended to control
roommate selection' First, the plain language of the FHA indicates that congress
intended the prohibition against discrimination to apply to the flpical landlord-
23
24
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28
tenant relationship and the sale of real properfy, and not to the selection of
someone who will share one's intimate living space. Roommate selection is not
equivalent to a commercial transaction involving housing stock, where the right to
occupy an entire dwelling is transferred, usually between strangers, and the
govemment has an interest in ensuring access for all, without preference.
,363/601089.r
ica, 88 Cal. App.4th45l, 105 Cal.
srpenerB
t 
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48' second, the goal of the FHA is to eliminare discrimination i
2 
ff 
housing and to promote diverse communities.
: 
ff 
tns. co. , 409 U.S. 20s, zrr (1972);
4ll cinrit-uti pnquir.r,943 F. zd 644, 652(6th cir. rggr). suppressing the speech
5 
ff 
of those who wish to share their homes does not further this purpose. Many
6 flpeople become roommates o they can live in a residence or communi ty thattheytl
z 
ff 
coutd not afford if they lived alone. Making such cohabitation more difficult
8 ff impermissibly burdens the efforts of members of historically repressed groups tot l
9 ff associate and perpetuates homogeneity in the more desirable locales.
l0 ll 49. Third, the "Mrs. Murphy exemption,, suggests that congresstl
1l fl did not intend to include roommate selection within the FHA. The ,,Mrs. Murphy
_ ^ t l12 ff exemption" provides that if a dwelling has four or fewer units and the o\ryner livest l
13 
ff 
in one of the units, the owner is exempt from the FHA,s non-discrimination
ta 
ff nrovisions' 
42 u.s.c. $ 3603(b). The policy underlying rhe exemption is, if
15 fl anything' more applicable to a roommate situation. The selection of a person totl
16 
ff 
share one's own living quarters must be one of the most intimate, personal
tz 
ff 
decisions one can make, and is more deserving ofprotection than the right to
18 ll select your neighbors.
tn 
ll 
50. The claims of Plaintifß fail all of the crireria of cenrral
20 ff Hudson' Because preferential roommate selection is lawful, the government doest l
21 
ff 
not have a substantial interest in controlling speech about it. As discussed above,
zzllthe selection of roommates i  beyond the power of the govemment, so it lacks at l
23 lf substantial interest in regulating speech relating to that selection, as required undert l
24ll central Hudson. postings that might offend or stereotype do not justisr content-tl25 ff based regulation . see Texas v. Johnson ,4gr u.s. 397, 4rz,4rg (r9g9); R.A.v.,il2611505 u.s. at 4r4 (whire, J., concurrin g); seeølso Robert G. schwemm,
27ll"Discriminatory Housing Statements and g 360a(c) :, ZgFordham Urb. L.J. lg7l l
28ll
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287-289 (expressing concern that section 3604(c), as a regulation of speech, not
conduct, does not survive R.A.V.).
51. Punishing publication of preferential roommate postings does
not directly advance, and is not "directly linked" to any governmental interest.
Even if it assumed that the government's interest in regulating speech about
roommate selection is fostering diversity (rather than stopping offensive speech,
which is inadequate), mtzzlingspeech does not directly advance that interest.
Those who wish to share their homes only with adults or people of their own sex.
religion, or race will do so whether or not publication of those preferences is
banned. Further, as discussed above, the restriction on speech urged by plaintiffs
simply makes cohabitation more difficult, and this, in furn, interferes with the
movement of the economically disadvantaged. The necessary "fit" under Central
Hudson is lacking where the regulation impedes the flow of tmthful, lawful
information because government patemalistically fears the impact on recipients.
Virginia State Board of Pharmac)¡,425 U.S. at 773;
of willingboro , 431u.s. 85, 96-97 (1977); see also schwemm, supra, zg
Fordham Urb. L.J. at280-82 (acknowledging insufficient 'ffit', between the FHA,s
purpose and section 360a@) where the underlyrng activity is exempt from other
FIIA provisions).
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52- The restriction urged by plaintiffs is more extensive than
necessary to serve the governmental interest. Section 360a(c) and section
12955(c) go far beyond what is necessary to serve any substantial governmental
interest. They impede a broad sweep ofprotected speech: The statutes are not
limited to public advertisements; they reach any "notice" or "statement,,, and this
necessarily includes the thousands of "roommail" communications among
Roommate.com's u ers. Indeed, Roommate's eryers now hold 1.3 million
messages. (Peters Decl. tf a.) Those messages certainly include countless
exchanges among potential roommates in which they describe themselves. If
4363/601089.r
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plaintifß' interpretation of the FHA and the FEHA is correct, Roommate is liable
for any preferential statement in these communications, as well as the public
postings. What plaintifß want to do is turn Roommate and other interactive
computer services into 'lthe government's policemen in enforcing section 3604(c)."
Housing Opporfunities, g43 F.2d at 653.
53. Also, plaintiffs'interpretation would create a substantial
societal burden, making the search for a compatible roommate more difficult and
burdensome. If individuals were prohibited from advertising roommate
preferences, serious inefficiencies would result. For example, people advertising
for roommates -- and people responding to such advertisements -- would be forced
to meet with and interview numerous individuals they would never choose to live
with. S¿¿ Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc. v. United States, 527 U.S.
I73,I94 (1999) (striking down casino advertising ban because it sacrificed ,,an
intolerable amount of truthful speech about lawful conduct when compared to the
policies at stake and the social ills that one could reasonably hope such:a ban to
eliminate").
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54. "If the First Amendment means anything, it means that
regulating speech must be a last -- not first -- resort." Thompson v. Western States
Medical Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 372 (2002). Where the government can "achieve its
interests in a manner that . . . restricts less speech, the Government must do so."
Id. at 371. Here, the govemmental interest in ensuring access to housing for
proiected classes is adequately achieved by enforcing the provisions of the FHA
and the FEHA that prohibit discrimination. The govemment and fair housing
otganizations uch as plaintiffs may place educational advertisements on the
Internet and in print publications. They also can offer their own placement '
services for those whom they believe are disadvantaged in the housing market.
55. In sum, then, the interpretation of the FHA and FEHA urged by
plaintifß is unconstitutional as a content-based regulation of speech. plaintifß'
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claims also fail under even the more relaxed cornmercial speech doctrine, because
they seek to impose an unjustified, excessive regulation of speech about lawfrrl
matters.
56. Plaintiffs'claims alleging violation of the Unruh Civil Rights
Act, violation of Business & Professions Code $ 17200, and for negligence fail for
the same reasons as the FHA and FEHA, because they also seek to impose liability
for speech based on content. Plaintifß offer no factual basis for these claims that
is different than their FHA and FEHA claims. The Unruh Act, section 17200, and,
negligence claims also fail because, if they are somehow interpreted to reach
speech relating to housing, they are void for vagueness. It is impossible to know
what statements are permitted or not permitted. See Reno, 521 U.S. atg74,
884-85; Board of Airyort comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus. Inc. ,4gz u.S. 569, 576
(re87).t 3
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COI-INTY OF LOS ANGELES,
I am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and
not a party to the within action; my business address is: 865 S. Figueroa Street, 10th Floor, Los Angeles,
California 90017.
On August 19,2004, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: SEPARATE
STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS LA\M
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on
the interested parry(ies) in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope,
addressed as follows:
Gary W. Rhoades
Law OffTces of Gary \il. Rhoades
834 l/2 S. Mansfield Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90036
Telephon e : (323) 937 -7 09 5; F a;xz (7 7 5) 6 40 -ZZ7 4
PROOF'OF SERVICE
l0l3A(3) CCP Revised 5/l/88
BY MAIL
*I deposited such envelope in the mail at
I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing
correspondence for mailing. It is deposited with U.S. postal seryice on that same day
with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of
business. I am aware that on motion of the par{y served, service is presumed invalid if
postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit
for mailing in affidavit.
-X- BY PERSONAL SERVICE I caused to be delivered such envelope by hand to the offices of the
addressee.
The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.
BY TELECOPIER By transmitting the above listed document(s) to the fax number(s) set forth on
this date.
BY FEDERAL Ð(PRESS by placing the document(s) listed above in such envelope for
deposit with FEDERAL Ð(PRESS to be delivered via priority overnight service to the
persons at the addresses et forth above.
Executed on August 19,2004, at Los Angeles; Califomia.
(State) I declare under penaþ of pedury under the laws of the State of California that the
above is true and correct.
@ederal) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at
whose direction the service was made.
DAVID CLARK
Tlpe orPrint Name
, Califomia.
Signature
